| CAC witness testifies to IURC regarding
safety related problems at AEP's Cook Nuclear Power Station. Indiana Michigan Power Company Fuel Cost Adjustment Proceeding, Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission Cause No. 38702-FAC40 TESTIMONY OF DAVID LOCHBAUM ON BEHALF OF CITIZENS ACTION COALITION OF INDIANA, INC.AND INDIANA CONSUMERS FOR FAIR UTILITY RATES Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME. A. My name is David Lochbaum. Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED? A. I am employed by the Union of Concerned Scientists ("UCS") in its Washington, D.C. office,1616 P Street NW, Suite 310. Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS PROCEEDING? A. I am testifying on behalf of the Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. ("CACI") and a group of industrial companies including Central Soya Co., Inc., Dana Corporation, Dodge Reliance Electric, General Motors Corporation, IN/TEK & IN/KOTE, Inland Steel Co., Phelps Dodge Co., and Portland Forge, collectively known as the Indiana Consumers for Fair Utility Rates ("ICFUR"). Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE UCS. A. UCS is an independent non-profit organization dedicated to advancing responsible public policies in areas where science and technology play a critical role. Nuclear power is one of those areas. For example, it was UCS’s interventions with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") which led to the 1980 adoption of industry-wide safety standards for fire protection at nuclear power plants. Q. WHAT IS YOUR POSITION WITH UCS? A. I serve as UCS’s Nuclear Safety Engineer, the organization’s lead technical expert on nuclear power safety. Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED BY UCS AS ITS NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEER? A. Since October of 1996. Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO YOUR SERVICE WITH UCS. A. For approximately 14 years, I was employed by Enercon Services Inc. as a Senior Engineer, with responsibilities including reactor engineering, startup testing, design engineering, licensing, training, computer software development, and system engineering. Prior to that, I held positions involving reactor engineering, Shift Technical Advisor coverage, and system engineering with the General Physics Corporation, Tennessee Valley Authority, General Electric Company, and Georgia Power Company. Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND. A. I received a Bachelor of Science in Nuclear Engineering from The University of Tennessee in June 1979. I completed a station nuclear engineer training program and was qualified as a Reactor Engineer by the Georgia Power Company in 1979. I completed a training program and was certified as a Shift Technical Advisor by the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1981. I completed General Electric’s Station Nuclear Engineer training course in 1983. Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND. A. I have approximately nineteen (19) years experience in commercial nuclear power plant start-up testing, operations, licensing, software development, training, and design engineering. I have authored a book entitled Nuclear Waste Disposal Crisis, have written numerous articles on various aspects of nuclear safety, and have made presentations on nuclear safety to the NRC, to the US Senate, and to local officials. Prior to my employment with UCS, a colleague and I identified and reported on deficiencies in the design for spent fuel pool cooling at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, resulting in safety improvements at that facility and scrutiny of similar problems at other operating plants. I also have worked on safety issues at the Salem Generating Station, Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Indian Point 3, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Limerick Generating Station, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Hope Creek Generating Station, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant and Hatch Nuclear Plant. Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING? A. The purpose of my testimony is to describe in detail the nature of and reasons for the problems with safety-related systems at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant which resulted in the shutdown of the Plant which began in September 1997 and is now expected to continue through at least December 31, 1998. Q. IN YOUR CURRENT CAPACITY AS NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEER FOR UCS, DO YOU HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVING THE DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT OF THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY ("AEP")? A. Yes, I regularly and routinely monitor safety-related developments at AEP’S Cook Plant as part of my responsibilities with UCS. As circumstances warrant, I also report to the NRC information made available to me which raises safety-related issues regarding the Cook Plant, along with requests that this information be investigated and, where indicated, appropriate corrective action taken. Q. WERE YOU MONITORING SAFETY-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS AT THE COOK PLANT WHEN THE CURRENT SHUTDOWN BEGAN IN SEPTEMBER 1997? A. Yes, I was. I increased the scope of my monitoring of safety-related developments at the Cook Plant shortly after I read the NRC’s Daily Events Reports in September 1997 about the problems discovered by an NRC inspection team. Q. DO YOU CONSIDER THE SHUTDOWN OF THE COOK PLANT WHICH BEGAN IN SEPTEMBER 1997 TO BE A SAFETY-RELATED DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES WITH UCS? A. Yes, I do. Q. WHY? A. The problems which resulted in both the initiation and the continuation of the shutdown of the Cook Plant involve systems and procedures which are classified by the NRC as safety-related and which are absolutely critical to the safe operation of the plant. Q. PLEASE BE MORE SPECIFIC. A. Units 1 and 2 of the Cook Plant were initially shut down in September 1997 because an inspection by the NRC of the plant for conformity with its licensed design basis disclosed problems with the Residual Heat Removal system which precluded the system’s operation as designed in the event of an accident requiring its use. The Residual Heat Removal system is essential to cool the reactor and prevent a meltdown in certain well-defined accident scenarios. In the case of the Cook Plant, the systems at both units had been modified in such a manner that they would not have been able to adequately cool the plant’s reactors. Additionally, in the event they had to be used in their degraded condition, the systems would have quickly lost even their reduced cooling capability because improperly installed fibrous material would have clogged drains required to recirculate cooling water. In January 1998, the Company was prepared to restart both Cook units. However, an NRC inspection prompted by information provided by UCS revealed that the ice condenser systems at both units were in such condition that they would not operate as designed (and required) in the event of an accident. As a result, the plants were not restarted as AEP had requested. Instead, the Company was required to undertake a review of the Cook Plant’s safety-related systems. In August 1998, the Company reported that it had identified over 700 additional problems with safety-related systems which would have to be corrected prior to restart. As a result, both units will be shut down through at least year-end. Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED AVAILABLE NRC REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE COOK PLANT SHUTDOWN? A. Yes, I have reviewed all of the significant documents sent to or initiated by the NRC relating to the Cook Plant shutdown which have been made public, including both NRC documents and correspondence from the Company. I have been added to the distribution list for all NRC correspondence to the Company regarding the Cook Plant. Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE SHUTDOWN? A. Yes, I have reviewed the non-confidential documents which the Company provided to CACI and ICFUR in the course of discovery in this proceeding, as well as certain UCS archive material relating to the problems at the Cook plant. Q. HAVE YOU ATTENDED THE PUBLIC HEARINGS HELD BY THE NRC REGARDING THE COOK PLANT SHUTDOWN? A. Yes, I attended a public meeting on the fibrous material problems in October 1997. I also attended the public meeting in January 1998 and the hearing in August, 1998 on UCS’s petition. Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE DIRECT TESTIMONY OF LOUIS S. GIBSON AND ROGER J. MATTSON, SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE COMPANY IN THIS PROCEEDING? A. Yes, I have. Q. GIVEN YOUR PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING REGARDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS GENERALLY AND THE INFORMATION YOU HAVE REGARDING THE CURRENT SHUTDOWN OF THE COOK PLANT SPECIFICALLY, DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION REGARDING THE REASON OR REASONS FOR THE COOK PLANT SHUTDOWN? A. Yes, I do. Q. WHAT IS THAT OPINION? A. The initial shutdown of Units 1 and 2 of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant in September 1997, its extension in January 1998, and its continuation through at least December 1998 are due essentially to serious deficiencies in AEP’s management of the plant’s safety-related systems, including inadequate housekeeping, inadequate control of engineering activities and inadequate configuration control. Such management deficiencies not only caused the initial shutdown, but also prolonged it unnecessarily because the Company repeatedly failed to identify and report on a timely basis significant, foreseeable and discoverable problems with the Cook Plant until after the NRC had discovered them and required the Company to take appropriate responsive action. Q. EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR YOUR OPINION THAT MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES ARE THE ESSENTIAL REASON FOR THE INITIAL SHUTDOWN OF THE COOK PLANT IN SEPTEMBER 1997. A. The NRC design inspection conducted during August and September 1997 at the Cook Plant identified problems with the Residual Heat Removal and Component Cooling Water systems. Problems with fibrous materials inside containment were also discovered. Despite AEP’s previous sworn representations to the NRC that the Cook Plant was operating within its design bases, the NRC identified problems that demonstrated that at least two safety-related systems were operating outside of their design bases–-clear violations of NRC regulations which the Company should previously have identified, reported and corrected. Q. WHAT WERE THOSE SYSTEMS? A. The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and the Component Cooling Water (CCW) systems. Q. IS IT SIGNIFICANT THAT ONLY TWO SYSTEMS WERE IDENTIFIED AS PROBLEMATIC? A. No. Those were the only systems inspected by the NRC during its design inspection. Q. WHAT WERE THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS WITH THE RHR AND CCW SYSTEMS? A. Among other problems, there was an insufficient quantity of water available to cool the reactor core and containment building in the event of an emergency, due to the presence of a wall which essentially restricted the amount of available water. That problem alone was sufficient to cause the Cook Plant to shut down. Problems with fibrous material inside containment were also discovered, meaning that water needed in an emergency would be blocked by fibers covering drains. In addition, contrary to standard practices where safety systems can be reconfigured to address contingencies and access different sources of cooling water in an emergency, the Cook Plant’s procedures created the possibility that all of its core cooling systems could be disabled. The NRC also identified problems with the CCW system at the Cook Plant. For example, NRC inspectors determined that AEP operated the Cook Plant during periods when the CCW system would have been unable to adequately cool all of its safety equipment. Q. HOW DO THESE PROBLEMS REFLECT DEFICIENCIES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COOK PLANT ON THE PART OF AEP? A. In a February 1997 letter to the NRC, AEP represented that more than 20 design base documents ("DBDs") had been completed and approved, including the DBD’s for the Residual Heat Removal and Component Cooling Water systems. Of the problems noted above, AEP should have ensured during the DBD validation process that cooling water availability in the event of an emergency was adequate, which it failed to do. AEP also should not have adopted emergency procedures which presented the risk that a single contingency could shut down all core cooling systems. With regard to the problem with fibrous materials, AEP had sufficient notice of the problems presented by drain blockage well in advance of the NRC inspections. On May 19, 1988, the NRC sent Information Notice No. 88-28, "Potential for Loss of Post-LOCA Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation Debris Blockage," to the Cook Plant, warning of the dangers of debris blockage. On November 21, 1989, the NRC sent Information Notice No. 89-77, "Debris in Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," to the Cook Plant, warning of drain blockage due to inadequate housekeeping and insufficient surveillance of containment emergency recirculation sumps. On January 30, 1990, the NRC sent Information Notice 90-07, "New Information Regarding Insulation Material Performance and Debris Blockage of PWR Containment Sumps," to the Cook Plant, again addressing debris blockages. On May 11, 1993, the NRC sent Bulletin No. 93-02, "Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers," to the Cook Plant. Such bulletin requested the following: All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, immediately upon receiving this bulletin, are requested to take the following actions: Identify fibrous air filters or other temporary sources of fibrous material, not designed to withstand a LOCA, which are installed or stored in your primary containment. Take any immediate compensatory measures which may be required to assure the functional capability of the ECCS. Take prompt action to remove any such material. Because of the low probability of a LOCA event, the staff considers removal of this material at the next shutdown, or within 120 days, whichever comes first, to be sufficiently prompt. On February 6, 1997, AEP sent a letter to the NRC stating that the Company had a program to review NRC information notices and bulletins to identify appropriate actions at the Cook Plant. In such letter, AEP also represented that design base documents ("DBDs") had been completed and approved, including the DBD’s for the Residual Heat Removal and Component Cooling Water systems. Nevertheless, despite (a) AEP’s representations and (b) warnings and explicit requests of the NRC during the ten (10) years prior to September, 1997, the emergency cooling system design flaws were overlooked and fibrous material was not identified or removed inside the containment. It is clear, then, that the problems which caused the initial shutdown of the Cook Plant could have been avoided if proper management of the safety-related systems at the Cook Plant had been exercised. Q. EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR YOUR OPINION THAT MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES ARE THE ESSENTIAL REASON FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE INITIAL SHUTDOWN OF THE COOK PLANT IN JANUARY 1998. A. In December 1997, AEP informed the NRC that all problems identified in NRC’s Confirmatory Action Letter had been corrected and the Plant was ready to restart safely. In April 1998, the NRC identified twenty-nine (29) apparent violations of federal safety regulations involving the ice condenser system at the Cook Plant from its inspections at the Plant during January and February 1998. Facing the distinct possibility of an NRC order if it did not do so, AEP elected to de-ice the ice condensers on both units for investigations and repairs, prolonging the dual unit outage for several months. At least as early as April 1995, the Cook Plant staff were notified of comparable problems with the functionally similar ice condenser system at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant and had confirmed that comparable problems were present in the Cook Plant ice condensers. This knowledge did not prevent AEP from seeking permission from the NRC in December of 1997 to restart the plant with these problems uncorrected. I brought the ice condenser problems to the attention of the NRC at a public meeting on January 12, 1998. In that meeting, I expressed concern to the NRC that the ice condensers at the Cook Plant could be vulnerable to the same problems encountered at the Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant in April 1995 when its ice condenser system engineer discovered ice basket screw heads and complete ice basket screws in the plant’s ice melt tank. As expressly found by ALJ Clement J. Kennington in the Watts Bar case decision, the Watts Bar system engineer called counterparts at the Cook Plant and "found that they had the same screw problem and had to use nuts and bolts to hold the baskets together." By letter dated December 2, 1997, AEP informed the NRC, "Based on the actions we have taken, we have reasonable assurance that our safety related systems are operable" and asserted "that Cook Nuclear Plant is ready to resume full power operation." (Part of the "actions" referenced in the letter included changes to the design and licensing bases for the ice condensers at the Cook Plant). The NRC performed inspections on the Cook Plant’s ice condensers from January 21, 1998 through February 27, 1998. By letter dated April 10, 1998, the NRC sent AEP an inspection report concerning the ice condensers. The report describes 29 apparent violations of NRC regulations, including "inadequate surveillance testing of the ice condenser," "inadequate control of contractors," "failure to implement technical specification requirements," "failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality," and "failure to update and maintain the Final Safety Analysis Report Appendices J and M, which contain the detailed description of the ice condenser." According to the letter, "inspectors’ intervention" was necessary to prompt AEP’s staff "to implement corrective actions for missing ice basket sheet metal screws, to take corrective actions for preventing the recurrence of loose U-bolt nuts and separated ice baskets, and to take appropriate corrective actions for the ice baskets with defective hold down welds." The letter concludes by stating: NRC intervention was needed to call attention to these programmatic problems. Further, the weaknesses in each of these program areas has directly or indirectly contributed to a poor state of material condition for each ice condenser, such that the ability of the ice condenser to perform its design function during past plant operation is in question. Allowing the ice condensers to degrade to this condition demonstrates that your staff did not pay appropriate attention to maintaining the reliability and availability of a key safety system. Q. EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR YOUR OPINION THAT MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES ARE THE ESSENTIAL REASON FOR THE EXPECTED CONTINUATION OF THE EXTENDED SHUTDOWN OF THE COOK PLANT THROUGH AT LEAST DECEMBER 1998. A. Despite AEP’s erroneous statement in December, 1997, that the Cook Plant was ready to restart operations, another obvious reason for the continued delay of the restart through at least December 1998 is that approximately seven hundred (700) "restart discrepancies" require correction, as stated last month by AEP itself during the NRC hearing. These "restart discrepancies" came to light as a direct result of the Cook Plant being subject to the provisions of Chapter 0350 of the NRC Inspection Manual with regard to its restart. These provisions apply to Cook because of AEP’s failure to identify or report as required design basis flaws in two critical safety-related systems and the numerous violations uncovered by the NRC’s inspection of the Cook Plant’s ice condensers despite AEP’s statements that the Cook Plant was ready to operate, that the ice condensers were in working order, and that the ice baskets were properly maintained, i.e. they were the direct result of AEP mismanagement. Thus, AEP mismanagement is the underlying reason that the extended Cook Plant shutdown will continue through at least December 1998. Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. GIBSON’S TESTIMONY WITH REGARD TO THE CAUSES FOR THE ORIGINAL SHUTDOWN, ITS SUBSEQUENT EXTENSION AND EXPECTED CONTINUATION? A. No. The Cook Plant operated for an unknown period of time with degraded safety systems. The Cook Plant management was, or should have been, aware of at least some of these degraded conditions from repeated NRC warnings and from information provided to Cook Plant staff by a system engineer at a similar plant. Had the Cook Plant management responded properly to this information, the Plant would not have operated for so long with so many degraded safety systems. In addition, a proper response would have allowed these degraded conditions to have been resolved during prior outages, thus significantly reducing the length and level of effort required by the current dual shutdown. Q. PLEASE ELABORATE ON THE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. A. Mr. Gibson incorrectly testified that the "outages were a direct result of actions beyond the reasonable control of AEP." As set forth above and in the NRC records, AEP had more than ample time and opportunity to correct the problems which caused the shutdown. Mr. Gibson attempts to downplay the seriousness of the Cook Plant’s violations by testifying that the inspections which revealed the violations "reflect an increasing level of NRC expectation" regarding safety systems which are "difficult, and in some instances, impossible" to satisfy. Of the fifteen (15) other plants (Ginna, Robinson 2, Vermont Yankee, Diablo Canyon, Three Mile Island, Arkansas Nuclear One, St. Lucie, Davis-Besse, Farley, Washington Nuclear Plant, Indian Point 2, Palisades, Wolf Creek, Cooper and Perry) that have undergone the same NRC design inspection as was conducted at the Cook Plant, none were shut down. It is clear, then, that the specific problems with the Cook Plant were limited to the management and operations of the Cook Plant, refuting Mr. Gibson’s statements that "increased NRC expectations" were the cause of the Cook Plant’s initial shutdown. Mr. Gibson implies in his testimony that AEP would have performed better during the NRC’s 1997 inspections had it been given more time on its design bases review projects. However, the systems which were found to be in violation of NRC regulations (the Residual Heat Removal and Component Cooling Water systems) had already been internally reviewed and approved by AEP by February, 1997, as indicated in the February 6, 1997 letter to the NRC. Mr. Gibson represents in his testimony that the shutdown’s continuation is the result of work on the Cook Plant’s ice condenser, which was brought to the Cook Plant’s attention through a network whereby "[t]he NRC and the nuclear power industry work together through information notices and other communications to keep licensees informed of emerging maintenance issues." Mr. Gibson also represents that the ice condenser work was performed because it was convenient to do the work during the shutdown. In his testimony, Mr. Gibson states that during outages prior to September 1997, the ice condenser system was subject to surveillance, basket components were inspected, and repairs were made "as necessary" to maintain the baskets in operating condition. Such representations are incorrect. The ice condenser system was not in safe operating condition in December 1997 but this deficient condition was not identified or reported to the NRC by AEP. Instead, UCS brought the ice condenser problems to the attention of the NRC and the NRC’s resulting inspection confirmed the problems, thereby requiring AEP to extend a shutdown it had planned to end in January 1998. In sum, there is no question that the shutdown and subsequent delays in restart could have been avoided had AEP exercised proper management of the Cook Plant safety-related systems on a timely basis. Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY? A. Yes.
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